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SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
         The plaintiffs-appellants are two learning-disabled 
children and their mothers who, frustrated with their inability 
to secure the special educational plans to which they claim they 
were entitled by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.  
1400-91, filed complaints with the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education (PDE).  When their complaints were inadequately 
addressed or unanswered by the PDE, the plaintiffs, joined by 
Parents Union for Public Schools, a non-profit educational 
advocacy organization, sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
by bringing suit against the PDE and the state Secretary of 
Education (jointly PDE), claiming that the Commonwealth had 
failed to comply with regulations promulgated by the United 
States Department of Education (DOE) governing procedures for 
resolution of complaints, and moved for class certification.  
         Although neither the PDE nor the U.S. Secretary of 
Education, who was also sued but has since been dismissed as a 
defendant, contended that plaintiffs did not have a private right 
of action, the district court directed briefing on that issue.  
Thereafter, the court, without reaching any of the substantive 
issues raised by the complaint, entered summary judgment against 
the plaintiffs on the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiffs did 
not have a right of action on their claim that the state had 
failed to maintain a timely and effective state-level complaint 
resolution system as required by IDEA and by the DOE regulations.  
Because we view the court's decision as inconsistent with the 
statutory language in IDEA establishing a private right of 
action, see 20 U.S.C.  1415(e), we will reverse and remand.  We 
will therefore not reach the numerous other issues raised by the 
parties on appeal. 
                                I. 
         IDEA, originally enacted in 1970 as the Education of 
the Handicapped Act (EHA), Pub. L. No. 91-230,  601-662, 84 
Stat. 175, confers on disabled children a substantive right to a 
"free appropriate public education."  20 U.S.C.  1400(c); seeHonig v. 
Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 308-10 (1988).  That free appropriate 
education "consists of educational instruction specially designed 
to meet the unique needs of the [disabled] child, supported by 
such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' 
from the instruction."  Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
188-89 (1982).  Under IDEA, a disabled student is entitled to an 
Individualized Education Plan (IEP), a specially tailored 
educational program detailing the student's present abilities, 
educational goals, and specific services designed to achieve 
those goals within a stated timeframe.  See 20 U.S.C.  
1401(a)(20).  
         IDEA places on the states the primary responsibility 
for satisfying the goals of the statute.  IDEA, described by 
several courts as a model of "cooperative federalism," see, e.g., 
Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir. 
1994); Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 783 
(1st Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 (1985), authorizes federal 
funding for states providing the special education that the 
statute requires, but funding is contingent on state compliance 
with its array of substantive and procedural requirements, 20 
U.S.C.  1412. 
         One of those requirements is the provision for 
procedural safeguards as outlined in the statute which maximize 
parental involvement in decisions affecting their children's 
education.  See 20 U.S.C.  1415.  Those procedures expressly 
include, inter alia, an opportunity for the parents or guardian 
of a handicapped child to examine all relevant records pertaining 
to the education of such child and written prior notice of 
proposals or refusals to initiate or change the identification, 
evaluation or educational placement of the child.  See  
1415(b)(1)(A), (C).  The statute also includes among the required 
procedures an opportunity to present complaints "with respect to 
any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to such child."   1415(b)(1)(E).  
Parents or guardians have the statutory right to secure an 
impartial due process hearing based on such a complaint to be 
conducted by the state, local or intermediate educational agency.  
1415(b)(2).  Parties aggrieved by the resulting findings and 
decision are entitled to bring a civil action in either state or 
federal court.   1415(e)(2).  The procedures specified in  
1415(b) are not exclusive, as the section states at the outset 
that "[t]he procedures required by this section shall include, 
but shall not be limited to" those specified. 
         In addition to the procedures specified in the statute, 
the states must also establish written procedures for resolving a 
complaint filed by an organization or individual that alleges a 
public agency has violated a requirement of IDEA or the related 
regulations.  The requirement to adopt certain minimum state 
complaint procedures is contained in regulations promulgated by 
the U.S. Department of Education (DOE).  These regulations were 
initially promulgated by the DOE in 1972 under IDEA's predecessor 
statute, the EHA, see 45 C.F.R.  121.109 (1972), and they have 
since been reissued twice under other statutory authority: first 
in 1980, referring to 20 U.S.C.  1221e-3(a)(1), part of the 
General Education Provisions Act, as the enabling statute, and 
again in 1993, this time referring to 20 U.S.C.  2831(a), part 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.  
         Although the current regulations are not in full haecverba with 
each of their predecessors, the current regulations, 
like the preceding regulations, require the state agency to have 
procedures for the receipt and resolution of such complaints and 
impose a time limit (60 days since 1980) for the state to carry 
out "an independent on-site investigation," if necessary, with an 
extension beyond the 60 calendar days, "only if exceptional 
circumstances exist with respect to a particular complaint."  
See, e.g., 300 C.F.R.  330.661 (1995); 45 C.F.R.  100b.780- 
.781 (1980).   The current regulations not only require the state 
educational agency to conduct any necessary investigation of a 
complaint, but also require that the state's complaint resolution 
procedures permit complainants to submit additional information, 
and that the state educational agency review all relevant 
information and issue a written decision addressing all 
allegations.  34 C.F.R.  300.661 (1995).  The state educational 
agency must also adopt, where necessary, "[p]rocedures for 
effective implementation" of its final decisions, including 
"corrective actions to achieve compliance."   300.661(c).    
         At this initial stage of the plaintiff's action, the 
record is meager with respect to the type of complaints that are 
generally the subject of these complaint resolution procedures,  
nor do we know with any certainty to what extent they may overlap 
with the due process procedures, as plaintiffs' counsel stated at 
oral argument.  It appears to be conceded by the PDE that the DOE 
regulations requiring a complaint resolution system encompass at 
least complaints of the type of system-wide deficiencies alleged 
here.  Oral Argument Transcript at 30-31 (Sept. 15, 1995); seealso Mrs. W. 
v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987).  The PDE 
does not deny that it has the obligation to maintain such a 
complaint resolution system for the prompt receipt, investigation 
and resolution of complaints that a public agency has violated 
IDEA or related regulations. 
         We turn to the allegations of the named plaintiffs, 
whose situations illustrate the types of complaints that the 
complaint resolution procedures may encompass.  Plaintiffs Beth 
V. and Brandon M., both of whom have specific learning 
disabilities, attend school in Pennsylvania.  Beth had had an IEP 
devised for her, but her mother, plaintiff Yvonne V., determined 
during the 1991-92 school year that Beth's school was not 
implementing it.   Concerned that her daughter's academic 
progress was withering, Yvonne filed two complaints with the PDE 
pursuant to the complaint resolution procedures--one in April 
1992 and another in February 1993.  Despite a directive by the 
DOE to the PDE to resolve the matter quickly, the PDE has never 
issued a decision and the complaints have never been resolved.   
         The complaint relating to Brandon M., the second child 
plaintiff, deals with his transfer to a different school after a 
year of showing academic and behavioral improvement.  His mother, 
plaintiff Frederica M., was given no prior notice or opportunity 
to object, and requested a due process hearing under  1415 of 
IDEA.  After three months, four such requests, and no hearing, 
Frederica filed a complaint with the PDE about his treatment.  
She did not receive the PDE's closure report until 190 days later 
and, although the PDE ordered Brandon's reinstatement at his 
original school, it failed to order the compensatory education he 
requested or to address the school district's failure to provide 
a due process hearing.  In the meantime, Brandon failed most of 
his courses.   
         Parents Union for Public Schools, a non-profit 
educational advocacy organization, has filed numerous complaints 
with the PDE on behalf of students with disabilities and their 
families.  It joined the individual plaintiffs in bringing suit 
against the PDE "on behalf of all Pennsylvania children with 
disabilities, and their parents or representatives, who are 
unable to rectify violations of their rights under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act."     
         In their district court complaint, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the complaints they filed with the PDE and/or its 
Division of Compliance had been inadequately and tardily 
processed.  More generally, they charged that the PDE's complaint 
resolution procedures were deficient in that the PDE failed to 
(1) resolve over 40% of its complaints within the required 
period; (2) address all allegations raised in complaints; (3) 
adequately order or enforce corrective action; or (4) permit 
interested parties to submit additional evidence before issuing 
reports.   
         The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief, urging the district court to require the PDE to adopt 
measures that would ensure compliance with the requirements of 
the regulations; submit a plan to ensure continued compliance and 
periodic reports; and publicize the availability and operation of 
its complaint procedures.  They also sought compensatory 
educational services for Beth V. and Brandon M., and 
reimbursement for those educational services their parents had 
privately secured for them while awaiting complaint resolution.  
Finally, the plaintiffs requested compensatory educational 
services and reimbursement for all other parties who had 
experienced delayed resolution of "founded complaints".  App. at 
30-32. 
         The plaintiffs asserted causes of action directly under 
IDEA, under the complaint resolution regulations, under 42 U.S.C. 
 1983, and under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  
They then moved for certification of a plaintiff class composed 
of Pennsylvania children, parents, and representatives who had 
used, or would use, the complaint resolution procedures.   
         The PDE stipulated to certification of the class as 
proposed.  Nonetheless, the district court declined to rule on 
the class issue on the ground that the interest shared by the 
plaintiffs and the PDE in securing increased state funding and 
resources for better complaint resolution "made it no longer 
feasible to rely primarily on the litigants to produce and 
develop factual materials."  Beth V. v. Carroll, 155 F.R.D. 529, 
533 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  The court stated that it would make an 
"independent determination" equipped with "more than a single 
perspective on key issues," id. at 534, and sua sponte appointed 
a special master, directing him not only to adduce facts relevant 
to the propriety of class certification but also to establish the 
controversy as one justiciable by an Article III court and to 
identify any third parties potentially disadvantaged by or 
opposed to the relief sought.  Id.   
         The master, who completed his report in August 1994, 
concluded that the relief sought was broader than the district 
court was empowered to fashion, and recommended against class 
certification.  He confirmed that the PDE failed to resolve one- 
third of the complaints within the required 60 days, and reported 
that the DOE's Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) had 
investigated the PDE's complaint procedures in late 1993 as part 
of its yearly review, found them inadequate, and ordered the PDE 
to develop and execute a plan for fuller compliance.   
         The master recommended against the broad injunctive 
relief requested by the plaintiffs.  He described that relief as 
approaching "direct supervisory control" by the district court 
over the PDE, concluded that the court's resulting role would 
overreach the Article III "case or controversy" requirement, and 
believed that the requested intervention was inconsistent with 
the U.S. Education Secretary's primary authority over--and 
ongoing supervision of--the PDE's compliance with IDEA.  He 
recommended that the district court limit its adjudication to 
particular harms to individual plaintiffs, and that it therefore 
decline class certification.  App. at 112-34.  In their response 
to the master's report, the plaintiffs included objections not 
only to the substance of the report but also to the appointment 
of the master for the purposes directed.  That issue is not 
raised by the plaintiffs on appeal because the master's report 
does not go to the issue of whether plaintiffs have a right of 
action 
.          
         The plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment.  The 
district court, again acting sua sponte, requested briefing on 
the existence of a private right of action to seek enforcement of 
the complaint resolution procedures.  Beth V. v. Carroll, No. 93- 
4418, 1994 WL 594267 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 1994).  Shortly after 
submission of the briefs and without oral argument, the court 
concluded that such a right of action did not exist, denied the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and instead entered 
summary judgment for the PDE on the plaintiffs' claims under IDEA 
and  1983.  Beth V. v. Carroll, 876 F. Supp. 1415 (E.D. Pa. 
1995).  The district court stated that it "decline[d] to imply a 
right of action in favor of private parties such as plaintiffs 
directly under the regulations at issue," id. at 1419; see id. at 
1426-32, and determined that "in light of the current efforts of 
the United States Secretary of Education . . . to resolve the 
very problems that are the impetus for this lawsuit, plaintiffs 
are foreclosed from enforcing those regulations under 42 U.S.C.  
1983," id. at 1419; see id. at 1432-36.  Thus, the district court 
disposed of the plaintiffs' claims that they had an implied right 
of action as well as an action under  1983, but gave no specific 
attention to the plaintiffs' invocation (albeit in a somewhat 
oblique manner) of an express right of action under  1415 of 
IDEA.  The court then denied as moot the motion for class 
certification.  Id. at 1423.  After plaintiffs moved to withdraw 
their Rehabilitation Act claim, the court dismissed it, seeAddendum II, 
and plaintiffs appealed.    
         The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
1331 and 1343, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
1291. 
                               II. 
         The ground on which we decide this appeal requires only 
that we consider whether the plaintiffs can rely on the express 
right of action contained in  1415 of IDEA.  Because the 
plaintiffs were blocked at the inception of their action, the 
district court never considered the merits of their claims.  The 
issue of the plaintiffs' right to sue under IDEA based on a claim 
that the state has failed to implement DOE's regulations for a 
complaint resolution procedure is an important one in the 
effectuation of the substantive rights established under IDEA.  
Thus, the fact that the district court gave the plaintiffs leave 
to refile their  1983 claim in the future is irrelevant to our 
review of its decision that the plaintiffs do not have a right of 
action under IDEA itself.  As the question is one of statutory 
construction, our review is plenary.  Doherty v. Teamsters 
Pension Trust Fund, 16 F.3d 1386, 1389 (3d Cir. 1994). 
                                A.      
         The express language of IDEA gives disabled children 
and their parents substantive and procedural rights as well as 
the right to seek judicial enforcement of those rights in a 
federal or state court.  Section 1415 of the Act provides: 
         (a) Establishment and maintenance 
              Any State educational agency . . . which 
         receives assistance under this subchapter 
         shall establish and maintain procedures in 
         accordance with subsection (b) through 
         subsection (e) of this section to assure that 
         children with disabilities and their parents 
         or guardians are guaranteed procedural 
         safeguards with respect to the provision of 
         free appropriate public education by such 
         agencies and units. 
 
         (b) Required procedures; hearing 
 
         (1) The procedures required by this section 
         shall include, but shall not be limited to -- 
              . . . . 
                   (E) an opportunity to present 
              complaints with respect to any matter 
              relating to the identification, 
              evaluation, or educational placement of 
              the child, or the provision of a free 
              appropriate public education to such 
              child. 
 
              (2) Whenever a complaint has been 
         received under paragraph (1) of this 
         subsection, the parents or guardian shall 
         have an opportunity for an impartial due 
         process hearing which shall be conducted by 
         the State educational agency or by the local 
         educational agency or intermediate 
         educational unit, as determined by State law 
         or by the State educational agency . . . .  
 
         (c) Review of local decision by State 
         educational agency 
              If the hearing required in paragraph (2) 
         of subsection (b) of this section is 
         conducted by a local educational agency or an 
         intermediate educational unit, any party 
         aggrieved by the findings and decision 
         rendered in such a hearing may appeal to the 
         State educational agency which shall conduct 
         an impartial review of such hearing.  The 
         officer conducting such review shall make an 
         independent decision upon completion of such 
         review. 
         . . . .  
         (e) Civil action; jurisdiction 
         . . . . 
              (2) Any party aggrieved by the findings 
         and decision made under subsection (b) of 
         this section who does not have the right to 
         an appeal under subsection (c) of this 
         section, and any party aggrieved by the 
         findings and decision under subsection (c) of 
         this section, shall have the right to bring a 
         civil action with respect to the complaint 
         presented pursuant to this section, which 
         action may be brought in any State court of 
         competent jurisdiction or in a district court 
         of the United States without regard to the 
         amount in controversy.  In any action brought 
         under this paragraph the court shall receive 
         the records of the administrative 
         proceedings, shall hear additional evidence 
         at the request of a party, and, basing its 
         decision on the preponderance of the 
         evidence, shall grant such relief as the 
         court determines is appropriate. 
         . . . . 
 
20 U.S.C.  1415 (emphasis added). 
         Thus, if the plaintiffs' claim that the PDE failed to 
implement or maintain an effective complaint resolution system to 
investigate and resolve complaints that there have been 
violations of IDEA or related regulations is one "with respect to 
any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to such child" as specified in  
1415(b)(1)(E), the language of  1415(e)(2) authorizing filing of 
a civil action plainly encompasses this lawsuit.  Nothing in the 
district court's opinion addressed why that express language 
fails to cover these plaintiffs and their claim. 
         The PDE argues that the plaintiffs' claim falls outside 
the subject matter limitation of  1415(b)(1)(E) because it is 
"about the sufficiency of a purely regulatory procedure" and does 
not involve "anyone's educational program."  Brief of Appellees 
at 12.  The argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. 
         First, the attempt by the plaintiffs to secure redress 
by complaint to the PDE arises out of the inability of the 
children involved to secure a satisfactory education and thus 
directly implicates "the provision of a free appropriate public 
education to such child" as required by  1415(b)(1)(E).   
         Second, even applying the PDE's stringently literal 
approach, we note that the statutory language in  1415(b)(1)(E) 
refers to the opportunity to submit not only a complaint that 
directly addresses "the provision of a free appropriate public 
education," but also one "with respect to any matter relating to" 
such provision.  Thus, the claim that is the subject of the 
judicial action authorized under  1415(e)(2) is broader than 
suggested by the PDE. 
         Third, the procedural safeguards undergirding the IDEA 
scheme lie at the core of  1415(e)(2) and its authorization of 
suit.  See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06 ("It seems to us no 
exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much 
emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and 
guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the 
administrative process, as it did upon the measurement of the 
resulting IEP against a substantive standard.") (citation 
omitted); Murphy v. Timberlane Regional Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 1186, 
1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 484 (1994) ("It is 
plainly true, of course . . . that not every procedural 
irregularity gives rise to liability under the IDEA.  
Nevertheless, 'procedural inadequacies [that have] compromised 
the pupil's right to an appropriate education . . . or caused a 
deprivation of educational benefits' are the stuff of successful 
IDEA actions.") (alteration in original) (citations omitted); seealso W.G. 
v. Board of Trustees, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 
1992) ("[P]rocedural inadequacies that result in the loss of 
educational opportunity or seriously infringe the parents' 
opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process" give 
rise to liability under IDEA's predecessor statute, EHA); Mrs. C. 
v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1990) (a party may "seek 
redress in the federal courts for the state's failure to provide 
any of the EHA procedural safeguards."); Christopher W. v. 
Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1095 (1st Cir. 1989) (both 
substantive and procedural violations of EHA fall within  
1415(b)(1)(E) "matters relating to"); Muth v. Central Bucks Sch. 
Dist., 839 F.2d 113, 120-26 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Delmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) 
(entertaining and sustaining  1415 claim that Pennsylvania's due 
process procedures deviated from requirements of EHA). 
         Fourth, the PDE's contention that the plaintiffs' 
claims involve only the adequacy of a regulatory procedure--and 
really involve no one's educational program--suggests that the 
plaintiffs are challenging only the abstract sufficiency of the 
PDE's complaint procedures with little connection to any 
underlying substantive educational concerns.  However, the PDE 
never suggests that the plaintiffs assert only a generalized 
grievance--enforcing the law for the law's sake.  Indeed, the PDE 
conceded at oral argument that there was no "standing problem" 
here.  Oral Argument Transcript at 34.  The immediacy of the 
issue to Beth V. and Brandon M. and their parents is evident from 
the treatment they received in their attempts to effectuate the 
substantive rights accorded them under the statute. 
         Fifth, the complaint resolution procedures were 
evidently designed by the DOE to afford persons such as the 
plaintiffs an opportunity to bring to the attention of a state 
agency claims of non-compliance with IDEA or related regulations 
without, as the complaint alleges, "having to resort to costly 
legal actions" for prompt and expeditious correction.  Indeed, 
the PDE apparently has promulgated written procedures for a 
complaint resolution system under IDEA, and the Master's Report 
itself states:   
         Federal regulations require that states 
         receiving federal money under the IDEA should 
         investigate, review and decide individual 
         complaints within sixty (60) calendar days.  
         See 34 CFR  300.661 (1993).  The DOC's 
         Complaint Management System accepts this 
         sixty day requirement as the applicable 
         timeline (subject to extension where 
         appropriate).  See DOC Procedures in Appendix 
         Exhibit "B" at 11. 
 
App. at 113-14.  If the PDE's position is sustained, those 
children and parents who are confronted with pervasive and 
entrenched obstacles to securing an adequate education would be 
precluded from seeking judicial relief in their effort to enforce 
the complaint resolution system which provides the opportunity to 
bring violations of IDEA to the attention of the state agency. 
         Finally, we note the coherence of purpose between the 
complaint resolution procedures and the IDEA scheme.  The nexus 
between the complaint resolution system and IDEA's mandate is 
evident by reference to the statutory language of IDEA.  Section 
1412(6) of IDEA imposes upon the state agency a broad obligation 
as follows:  
              The State educational agency shall be 
         responsible for assuring that the 
         requirements of this subchapter are carried 
         out and that all educational programs for 
         children with disabilities within the State, 
         including all such programs administered by 
         any other State or local agency, will be 
         under the general supervision of the persons 
         responsible for educational programs for 
         children with disabilities in the State 
         educational agency and shall meet education 
         standards of the State educational agency. 
 
20 U.S.C.  1412(6).   
         The PDE suggests that this mandate of  1412(6) is a 
limited one, requiring that states assure only that "the 
requirements of this subchapter are carried out."  The PDE argues 
that because "this subchapter" includes only  1411 through 1420 
of IDEA,  1412(6) cannot be read to command compliance with 
nonstatutory complaint procedures.  This argument neglects the 
fact that the relevant "subchapter" also includes  1412(1), a 
provision that requires that each "state ha[ve] in effect a 
policy that assures all children with disabilities the right to a 
free appropriate public education."  20 U.S.C.  1412(1) (1995).  
         The "purpose" clause of the DOE regulations in their 
current form is as follows: 
         To ensure that all children with disabilities have 
         available to them a free appropriate public education 
         that includes special education and related services to 
         meet their unique needs [and] [t]o ensure that the 
         rights of children with disabilities and their parents 
         are protected . . . . 
 
34 C.F.R.  300.1(a)-(b) (1995). 
         This language is strikingly parallel with that of 
IDEA's  1412(1), and makes clear the link between the need to 
maintain an operational complaint resolution system, the 
requirement of  1412(1) of IDEA that states maintain policies 
assuring the right to a free appropriate public education, and 
the mandate of  1412(6) of IDEA that the state educational 
agency ensure execution and compliance of these policies.  
          
         The only other appellate decision of which we are aware 
to consider a comparable issue upheld the plaintiffs' right to 
sue on allegations that their state had systematically failed to 
implement the regulatory complaint procedures of 34 C.F.R.  
300.660-.662.  See Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 759 (2d Cir. 
1987) (permitting plaintiffs "to pursue claimed EHA violations" 
through suit under 42 U.S.C.  1983 where "the pleadings indicate 
that defendants refused to consider and resolve complaints of 
system-wide violations of the EHA").  The Second Circuit reached 
that conclusion after a comprehensive review of the legislative 
history accompanying  1415(f) of the EHA, because it found that 
Congress' intent to permit private actions to enforce the EHA's 
provisions was clear.  Id. at 754-55.   
         On remand, the district court denied the defendants' 
renewed motion for judgment on the pleadings, reasoning that 
inasmuch as the state agency has the statutory responsibility to 
assure that educational programs in the state for disabled 
persons are operated in accordance with the applicable statute, 
the state agency is required to provide complaint resolution 
procedures to address complaints of violations of federal law.  
Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 706 Supp. 164, 168 (D. Conn. 1989).  That 
court further observed that the plaintiffs' claim asserted not 
simply a "violation of the [complaint resolution procedures] nor 
the underlying authorizing statute," but rather a "violation of 
the State Board's obligation to monitor and ensure compliance 
with the EHA by state and local educational agencies," a 
statutory obligation.  Id. at 166.   
         We note furthermore that our holding is consistent with 
Congress' view that private suits are integral to enforcement of 
IDEA.  Congress' reliance on a private action as one of the 
principal enforcement mechanisms of the rights guaranteed under 
IDEA is demonstrated by its prompt enactment of a 1989 amendment 
to IDEA which makes express its abrogation of the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.  See 20 U.S.C.  1403 
(overturning the decision in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 
(1989)).   
         Consistent with the palpable nexus between the 
provision of a free appropriate public education mandated by IDEA 
and the DOE regulations requiring procedures for bringing 
complaints of violations of IDEA and related regulations to the 
attention of the state agency, we hold that the plaintiffs, who 
allege that the PDE has consistently failed to investigate and 
timely resolve such complaints, enjoy an express right of action 
under  1415 of IDEA.  It is therefore unnecessary for us to 
consider the plaintiffs' contention that they also have an 
implied right of action under IDEA or may sue under 42 U.S.C.  
1983. 
                                B. 
         Admittedly, the plaintiffs failed to meet the 
requirement of  1415 that complainants filing suit must first 
secure a due process hearing and exhaust opportunity for 
administrative appeal.  20 U.S.C.  1415(b)(2) & (e)(2); seeKomninos v. 
Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  The plaintiffs contend that they should be excused 
from the administrative exhaustion requirement because they fall 
within one of the exceptions recognized by this court.   
         In Komninos, where we addressed exhaustion specifically 
in the IDEA  1415 context, we stated that claimants may "bypass 
the administrative process" (1) "where exhaustion would be futile 
or inadequate," id. (quoting Honig, 484 U.S. at 327); see alsoH.R. Rep. 
No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985) [hereinafter 
1985 House Report] (no exhaustion required where "it would be 
futile to use the due process procedures"); (2) "where the issue 
presented is purely a legal question," Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778 
(citing Lester H., 916 F.2d at 869-70); (3) "where the 
administrative agency cannot grant relief," id.; see also 1995 
House Report at 7 (no exhaustion required where "it is improbable 
that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative 
remedies"); and (4) "when exhaustion would work 'severe or 
irreparable harm' upon a litigant," Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778 
(quoting Christopher W., 877 F.2d at 1097). 
         In the IDEA  1415 context, plaintiffs may thus be 
excused from the pursuit of administrative remedies where they 
allege systemic legal deficiencies and, correspondingly, request 
system-wide relief that cannot be provided (or even addressed) 
through the administrative process.  See Mrs. W., 832 F.2d at 
756-57 (waiving IDEA exhaustion requirement for plaintiffs who 
challenged adequacy of state's complaint resolution procedures 
under 42 U.S.C.  1983 where plaintiffs alleged that violations 
were "unable to be addressed at the due process hearings provided 
in Connecticut" and that the hearing officer lacked the authority 
to provide system-wide relief); 1985 House Report at 7 (no 
exhaustion required where "an agency has adopted a policy or 
pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to 
the law").  To the extent that this exception merely flows 
implicitly from, or is in fact subsumed by, the futility and no- 
administrative-relief exceptions, we view it as among 
traditionally respected bases for a waiver of  1415's exhaustion 
requirement. 
         The plaintiffs' claim in this case is, in essence, that 
the safeguards to ensure timely and adequate resolution of 
complaints that were the object of the DOE regulations requiring 
complaint resolution procedures have failed on a system-wide 
basis and thus the sufficiency of the state's complaint 
procedures itself must be challenged.  Their claim may contain 
elements of one or more of the recognized exceptions to 
exhaustion.  However, we do not decide that issue in the first 
instance.  Because the district court failed to address directly 
the plaintiffs' assertion of an express right of action under  
1415, that court never discussed whether the plaintiffs may 
qualify for a waiver of  1415's exhaustion requirement.  We are 
certainly not prepared to say they do not.  Instead, we will 
remand the case to the district court to determine, inter alia, 
whether the plaintiffs need exhaust the administrative remedies 
specified in  1415. 
                               III. 
         In light of the foregoing discussion, we will reverse 
the district court's grant of summary judgment against the 
plaintiffs' direct IDEA claim under  1415, and remand for 
further proceedings, including reconsideration of the class 
certification issue.  In doing so we do not decide what relief, 
if any, the plaintiffs may be entitled to at this time should 
they prove, or the defendants concede, the relevant allegations.  
The plaintiffs originally requested injunctive relief, a 
declaratory judgment and compensatory education.  The district 
court is free to consider whether the situation at the present 
time has substantially altered the need for any of this relief. 
 
                            
 
 
 
 
 
